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In the Supreme Court of the United States 
OCTOBER TERM, 1956. 
No. 352. 
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF OHIO, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 
TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI. 
To THE HONORABLE CHIEF JusTICE AND THE AssocIATE 
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
OBJECTIONS TO JURISDICTION. 
The State court has not decided a federal question of 
substance not theretofore determined by this Court, nor 
has the State court decided any question in a way not in 
accord with applicable decisions of this Court. No real nor 
substantial federal question is involved herein. 
The claims of petitioner that he was denied his con-
stitutional rights are based entirely on faulty assumptions 
or wild assertions, or on misstatements made pertaining 
to the proceedings and to the evidence. When the same 
misstatements were made on the motion for new trial, the 
trial court found it necessary to state: 
"The court has deemed this memorandum neces-
sary due to some statements made by counsel for the 
defense during trial and repeated or enlarged in said 
motion. Some are not factually true and some others 
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create or tend to create impressions not representative 
of the true situation." (Pet. App., pp. la-2a.) 
We readily concede that there was widespread pub-
licity, all of which was noted by the trial and reviewing 
courts. But the claims that either the jury or judge were 
influenced in the trial of the case by news media or by 
anything other than the evidence received in open court 
are groundless and unsupported by the record. And a fair 
and objective examination of the record will disclose that 
the news media did not slant their stories to prejudice or 
to convict the petitioner. 
Counsel for the petitioner refer to certain newspaper 
articles and headlines which were later submitted as Ex-
hibit No. 1 on the motion for new trial. Neither the news-
papers nor the headlines were evidence in the trial of the 
case and counsel's assertion that during the trial the jury 
were reading these newspapers is nowhere supported in 
the record. In various places in the petitioner's brief, 
reference is made to newspaper articles and headlines, 
none of which were received in evidence on the trial of 
this cause. The fact that they were offered and received 
in evidence before and after trial on the various motions 
made by counsel for the petitioner does not make them 
evidence considered by the jury in the trial. 
Of a certainty, there is in the record no proof, no 
"demonstrable reality" that either the jury or the judge 
were influenced in the trial of this case by anything ex-
cept the evidence presented in open court and the law 
applicable thereto. The petitioner was tried by a fair and 
impartial jury who were properly instructed at all times by 
the court and rendered their verdict after careful and 
conscientious deliberations. The petitioner was fairly tried 
and properly convicted. 
3 
Counsel for the petitioner not only conducted a 
searching voir dire examination, and did not exhaust his 
peremptory challenges, but stated to the jury in argument: 
"May I take this opportunity-as I started to say, 
may I take this opportunity to congratulate you on the 
splendid attention, the tireless effort you have dis-
played during these nine weeks. You have been de-
prived, probably, of many comforts that you ordinar-
ily enjoyed in and around your home with your 
family because of the admonitions that you have re-
ceived throughout the trial by his Honor, Judge Bly-
thin. 
"The purpose, ladies and gentlemen, of those ad-
monitions was that we could come to this point in the 
lawsuit where your minds would be free, your minds 
would be open, and that you could take into con-
sideration all the facts and all the testimony that has 
been submitted to you without any outside influence, 
and I am sure, and I say this to you sincerely, because 
I have had the opportunity of observation during this 
entire period, that you have done just that." (R. 5371-
72.) * 
During the impaneling of the jury, the progress of 
the trial, the instructions of the court and the summations 
of the attorneys, the jurors were repeatedly told that this 
cause was to be decided solely on the basis of the evidence 
presented in open court and on the law given them by the 
judge, and on nothing else. Each juror agreed that he or 
she would disregard everything other than the evidence 
and would, in conformity with the instructions of the 
court, render a fair and impartial verdict. It is to be noted 
that a fair and impartial jury was impaneled and that the 
defense did not exhaust their peremptory challenges. The 
jurors took the oat.h required by law and there is not a 
* Typewritten record. Original Bill of Exceptions filed in 
Washington. 
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shred of evidence in the record that each and every juror 
did not fully and completely abide by the oath so taken. 
There is not a particle of evidence in the record to 
show that the jury was in any way influenced by reports 
or stories in newspapers, over the radio, or on television; 
or that the jury or any juror was biased or prejudiced by 
any such stories or broadcasts. 
The laws of the State of Ohio provide for a motion 
for new trial and upon the hearing of that motion, the 
affidavits and testimony of the jurors may be received. 
Emmert v. State, 127 0. S. 235; State v. Joseph, 90 0. A. 
433. Although several jurors were subpoenaed and were 
thoroughly interrogated by defense counsel on the hear-
ing on the motion for new trial, not a word of testimony 
was produced to justify the defense claim that the jurors 
were influenced by anyt.hing other than the evidence pro-
duced in open court in reaching their verdict. The claim 
that they were influenced by news stories or any other out-
side influence is merely the assertion of counsel. It is not 
supported by the record. 
The trial and proceedings on review were had in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the statutes and Constitu-
tion of the State of Ohio and in full conformance with the 
provisions of the Federal Constitution. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
The extraordinary excursions in petitioner's brief to 
newspaper stories and editorials published before, during 
and after the trial, as though they were before the jury as 
evidence in the case, and the omission by the petitioner 
of almost all of the pertinent evidence presented by the 
State in this case, necessitates our directing the attention 
of this Court to an objective statement of much of the evi-
dence as set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals 
of Cuyahoga County, appearing at pages 41a to 67a of 
the Appendix to the Petition. 
The State proved by direct and circumstantial evi-
dence that Marilyn Sheppard was brutally murdered in 
her bedroom sometime between 3 and 4 A. M. on the 
morning of July 4, 1954; that at the time she was mur-
dered the only person in that home, except a six year old 
son, was her husband, the petitioner. It was conclusive 
from the evidence that there was a simulated burglary and 
that nobody but the petitioner had the time and the op-
portunity to fake such a burglary to divert suspicion from 
himself. The fantastic stories told by the petitioner were 
so unreasonable and absurd as to be, in the opinion of 
the jury, unworthy of credence. 
After giving "a summary of much of the evidence 
dealing with many of the physical facts and conditions 
of the premises as found on July 4th and of the declara-
tions and actions of the parties involved as testified to by 
the public authorities and other witnesses, together with 
what the defendant said to others and in his testimony 
upon trial in relation to the events of the morning" ( 66a 
of the Appendix to the Petition), the Court of Appeals 
then continued: 
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"T.he testimony of the defendant, in dealing with 
the events that took. place in his presence or the 
things that he did, was characterized by the State as 
vague, indefinite, uncertain or factually highly im-
probable. During the time he was under cross-exami-
nation the defendant gave evasive answers such as 
'I can't recall' or 'I can't remember,' approximately 
216 times to questions concerning facts and circum-
stances that took place in his claimed presence mate-
rial to the issues in the case. 
"The jury, under the instruction of the court, was 
presented with but one question or issue of fact and 
that was, had the State shown beyond reasonable 
doubt that the defendant purposely killed Marilyn 
Sheppard? 
"The State's case is based in part on circumstan-
tial evidence. The law of Ohio on this subject re-
quires that the facts and circumstances upon which 
the theory of guilt is based must be established be-
yond reasonable doubt and the facts so established 
must be entirely irreconcilable with any claim or 
theory of innocence and admit of no other hypothesis 
than the guilt of the accused. Carter vs. State, 4 Oh. 
App. 193. 
"If, therefore, the jury, after careful deliberation, 
found t.hat there was any possible hypothesis of in-
nocence, after a consideration of all of the evidence, 
then the defendant would be legally entitled to be dis-
charged, but if the jury found, after full deliberation, 
there was no possible hypothesis of innocence based 
on the facts as they found them to be and that the 
facts found are such as to be irreconcilable with any 
other reasonable hypothesis, than the guilt of the 
accused, then a verdict was required. 
"This was a jury question and we hold that there 
was sufficient evidence to support the verdict of guilty 
as found by the jury." (Appendix to the Petition 
66a-67a.) 
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ARGUMENT. 
PUBLICITY DID NOT DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF ms 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
I and II. 
Publicity did not prevent the petitioner from 
having a fair trial. 
No matter when or where tried, the Sheppard case 
would have attracted widespread publicity. This was in-
herent in the very nature of the case itself. The right to 
grant a change of venue lies in the sound discretion of the 
trial court. The trial court stated on the motion for new 
trial in ruling on the denial of the motion for change of 
venue and for a continuance: 
"(3) Denial of change of venue requested by de-
fendant. The request, when made, was based upon 
the claim that the extraordinary public attention 
centered upon the case in this county by the various 
media of news made the securing of a fair and impar-
tial jury in this county impossible. It is a matter of 
common knowledge that the case commanded that 
same attention throughout Ohio and the United States 
of America. It commanded very much attention 
throughout the free world. Chief counsel for the de-
f ense conceded and asserted this to be a fact and stated 
fervently that the defendant could not have a fair trial 
in Ohio, or even in the United States. The only con-
clusion from that assertion must be that the defendant 
cannot be tried at all on an indictment for Murder in 
the First Degree. Such a claim furnishes its own 
answer. 
"Seldom indeed has there been a case about which 
the average citizen was so confused by the published 
stories, or more uncertain about what the facts actu-
ally were. With present-day means of communica-
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tion the same precise stories were simultaneously pub-
lished in every city and county in the State and it 
certainly will not be denied that Cuyahoga County 
is the most liberal county in the State and, as a result, 
the best in which to conduct a trial involving a much 
publicized charge of crime, whatever its nature. It is 
to be borne in mind that no issues which break into 
fiames and which tend to produce passion and preju-
dice were involved in this cause. No issue of race, 
corruption, killing an officer, or the like, was involved 
-what actually was involved was a mere mystery-
a 'whodunit.' The only safe and sure way to deter-
mine whether a fair and impartial jury can be secured 
is to proceed to impanel one. The court reserved rul-
ing on the motion pending such an effort and became 
convinced, and is still convinced, that an intelligent, 
sincere, patriotic and fair jury was impaneled. Upon 
that being accomplished the court overruled the mo-
tion and believes such action was not error. Section 
2945.06 Revised Code of Ohio provides that a person 
charged in a case such as this may waive trial by jury 
and elect to be tried by a panel of three judges. While 
not challenging the right of a defendant, in a proper 
case, to a change of venue it does seem that the lack of 
confidence in any jury anywhere, coupled with the 
failure to elect to be tried by a panel of three judges, 
smacks of objection to any trial at all. 
" ( 4) Error in denying application for continuance. 
The crime charged in the indictment occurred on July 
4. Trial started October 18. Defendant's counsel had 
been engaged and active from a time within hours 
following the crime and long before defendant's arrest. 
Seventy-five prospective jurors had been summoned 
with full knowledge of all counsel long before any 
application for continuance was filed. The only ground 
stated for a continuance was 'to permit the extraordi-
nary publicity to quiet down.' It was not claimed that 
counsel were not prepared for trial nor was any sug-
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gestion made as to who was going to 'quiet down' the 
publicity, nor when nor how." (Pet. App. pp. 2a-4a.) 
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Ohio, Judge 
Bell stated: 
"Murder and mystery, society, sex and suspense· 
were combined in this case in such a manner as to 
intrigue and captivate the public fancy to a degree 
perhaps unparalleled in recent annals. Throughout 
the preindictment investigation, the subsequent legal 
skirmishes and the nine-week trial, circulation-con-
scious editors catered to the insatiable interest of the 
American public in the bizarre. Special seating facili-
ties for reporters and columnists representing local 
papers and all major news services were installed in 
the courtroom. Special rooms in the Criminal Courts 
Building were equipped for broadcasters and tele-
casters. In this atmosphere of a 'Roman holiday' for 
the news media, Sam Sheppard stood trial for his 
life." (Pet. App., pp. 85a-86a.) 
The reference by the Ohio Supreme Court to the 
words "Roman holiday" merely describes the widespread 
publicity furnished by the news media to the public at 
large and had no reference to the conduct of the trial it-
self, nor to the proceedings in the courtroom. The expres-
sion is also used to mean a "good time" or "field day." It 
by no means follows that the news media slanted the news 
or even tried to do so to prejudice or to convict the peti-
tioner. As clearly indicated by Judge Bell in his opinion, it 
was a case involving "murder and mystery, society, sex and 
suspense." The curiosity of the public, excessive though it 
may have been, necessarily brought about the widespread 
publicity. The news media were interested in stories for 
the public and cared not whether such stories favored the 
State or the defense. A fair and objective analysis of their 
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stories to the public will disclose that they made no effort 
to slant the stories, certainly not to influence the jury in 
arriving at their verdict. 
The defense have submitted a wholly distorted picture 
of the arrangements made by the court before trial to gov-
ern the news media which were to "cover" the trial. (Pet. 
Br. pp. 38-40.) (Pet. App. pp. l 7la-172a.) For a fair 
and objective statement pertaining to such arrangements, 
we direct the attention of this Court to the words of the 
trial judge in his memorandum on the motion for new 
trial. 
Regardless of what action was taken by the trial court, 
it was certain that all of these newspaper reporters were 
to be present and that demands would inevitably be made 
upon the trial court by all types of news media. The trial 
Judge stated, in ruling upon the motion for new trial: 
"Realizing that the case had caught the public 
imagination to an extent leading national and, indeed, 
international news media to decide to fully 'cover' 
the trial, and having requests for space from many of 
them, the Court decided to make proper arrangements 
before trial and to control the situation so as to 
minimize and, if possible, eliminate confusion during 
the trial. The court room is small. 
"The Court assigned specific seats to individual 
correspondents in the rear of the court room and back 
of the trial area, and issued orders that there was to be 
no crowding or congregating at the front end en-
trances (one on each side of the bench) of the court 
room; that there was to be no passing back and forth 
through the trial area and that all entries to and mov-
ings out of the court room be via the public doorway 
in the rear of the court room. Members of the de-
fendant's family were accommodated with seats at 
all times during the trial. The same was accorded 
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members of the family of the murdered Marilyn. 
Members of the general public were admitted to the 
extent of the seating capacity of the court room and 
a scheme of rotation was established so that many 
persons attended some sessions of the trial and no 
favored members of the general public were present 
at all times, nor permitted to be. 
"Rules were prescribed for photographers and rep-
resentatives of radio and television stations. They 
were cautioned that no cameras were to be permitted 
in the court room excepting in the morning before 
the convening of court and at the close of the day 
after adjournment, and that in no event were pic-
tures of the defendant to be taken in the court room 
at any time excepting with his consent or that of his 
counsel. 
"The Court's arrangements and orders were car-
ried out with one or two simple insignificant excep-
tions, due to overenthusiasm. The defendant and his 
chief counsel were far more gracious to the press, 
photographers and gallery than was the Court. A 
very large number of pictures of the defendant, his 
family, counsel and friends were taken in the court 
room (outside of court session periods) with their 
permission and without complaint. Counsel for the 
defense held press conferences in the court room with 
cameras clicking; all to the apparent delight of counsel 
for the defense, and, naturally, without protest. 
"Julian Wilson, a photographer for the Associated 
Press, testified on this point at the hearing had on the 
motion and supplemental motion. His testimony 
stands wholly unchallenged and it states the pro-
cedure followed with perfect clarity. 
"Jurors were fl.ash-photographed in their comings 
and goings and it is difficult to know how that can 
be prevented even if, indeed, it should be. Jurors 
are human beings and become citizens of special im-
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portance when undertaking a signal public service. 
Not a single complaint was registered by any juror 
in this connection and it is worthy of note that the 
defense does not even claim that any juror was af-
fected in the least by it. Furthermore, they were not 
flashed by agents of the State nor on its behalf. Such 
exposures to public attention are not matters of preju-
dice for or against either the State or the defendant, 
but matters of news interest to newspapers. They 
remain wholly neutral if fed sufficient news or pic-
tures of interest. 
"Some space outside of the court room which could 
be spared for the moment without interference with 
the public service was used by publicity agencies for 
their typewriters and other equipment but it is defi-
nitely not true, as stated in the motion herein, that: 
'The Assignment Room, where cases are assigned 
for other causes to court rooms, was assigned by the 
Court to reporters and telegraphers.' 
"Some generally unused space in the Assignment Room 
was so assigned. Neither person, record, nor piece 
of equipment in the Assignment Room was moved, 
removed or displaced and the Assignment Room 
functioned normally throughout the entire period of 
the trial of this cause. One of the real purposes of 
assigning that space to the uses mentioned was to 
remove them entirely from the immediate court room 
area. They were out of the corridors leading to the 
court room and permitted free movement of the pub-
lic and visitors within the building, whether there in 
connection with this case or otherwise, wholly un-
affected by the Assignment Room space activity." 
(Pet. App., pp. 7a-9a.) 
It is pertinent to ask: What caused the publicity, and 
who brought it about? 
Marilyn Sheppard was murdered-there could be no 
doubt about that-and it became the duty of law enforce-
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ment officers to thoroughly investigate and to bring to 
justice the person who murdered her. A protective shield 
was immediately thrown around the petitioner. The of-
ficials of Bay Village, close personal friends of the peti-
tioner who was their police surgeon, sat on their hands and 
were getting nowhere. It was inevitable that there would 
be publicity concerning the petitioner's unwillingness to 
be interrogated, save on his own terms and conditions, and 
that the public officials would be criticized, such criticism 
of public officials not being the exclusive prerogative of 
defense counsel. These incidents occurred in July and the 
trial did not begin until the 18th of October. 
There was no assurance that the publicity would not 
continue if a motion for a continuance was granted. Fur-
ther, the trial court was not required to speculate as to 
whether a trial at a later date would result in more or less 
publicity. The Constitution provides that the defendant in 
a criminal case is entitled to a speedy and public trial. As 
it was, the petitioner was not brought to trial until three 
and a half months after the crime was committed, and 
the trial court was not required, in view of the Constitu-
tional provision, to delay the trial indefinitely, otherwise 
the petitioner could be heard to complain that his con-
stitutional right to a speedy and public trial was violated. 
It is not within our province to explain or defend 
anything that appears in any newspaper, favorable or un-
favorable. That there was a tremendous amount of interest 
in this case, not only throughout our own community, but 
throughout the state and nation, and in other parts of the 
world, is not in dispute. It does not follow, however, from 
the mere fact that this murder mystery fascinated so many 
people, that the petitioner was prevented from having a 
fair trial or that any of the petitioner's constitutional rights 
were violated. 
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Petitioner has seen fit to set forth what purport to be 
newspaper headlines. (Pet. Br. pp. 20, 21.) Selected were 
certain headlines, which, by and large, merely· reflected 
the great interest of the public in the murder mystery and, 
of course, deliberately omitted were particular headlines 
that tend to contradict his assertions. Petitioner does not 
set forth the headline on the front page story in the Cleve-
land News of July 9, 1954, by Severino P. Severino, News 
Staff Writer, who, as he states, was granted permission to 
question Dr. Sam in the presence of his father, Dr. Richard 
A. Sheppard, and his attorneys, William J. Corrigan and 
Arthur Petersilge. The headline in large type reads: 
"EXCLUSIVE! 'I LOVED MY WIFE-SHE LOVED ME,' 
SHEPPARD TELLS NEWS REPORTER." 
Nor does he list the headline in the Cleveland Press of 
August 18, 1954, reading: 
"DR. SAM WRITES HIS OWN STORY." 
Under the headline appeared the text of a statement by 
Dr. Samuel H. Sheppard, furnished the Press by a member 
of his family, and above the headline is an enlarged photo-
graph of the last paragraph of the statement, followed by 
the signature of the petitioner, and reading: 
"I AM NOT GUILTY OF THE MURDER OF MY WIFE, 
MARILYN. HOW COULD I, WHO HAVE BEEN 
TRAINED TO HELP PEOPLE AND DEVOTED MY LIFE 
TO SAVING LIFE, COMMIT SUCH A TERRIBLE AND 
REVOLTING CRIME?" 
Nor does petitioner list the headlines of the statements 
issued by Attorneys William J. Corrigan and Fred W. 
Garmone, such as the one appearing in the Cleveland 
Press of August 27, 1954, reading: 
"SHEPPARD LA WYERS HIT STORIES ON MURDER" 
followed by the text of the long statement so issued. 
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The defense also might have included other headlines 
as follows: 
July 8, 1954, The Cleveland Press: 
"DR. SHEPPARD'S STATEMENT ISSUED TO ANSWER 
GOSSIP" 
July 8, 1954, The Cleveland Plain Dealer: 
"BAY DOCTOR TALKS TO REPORTER" 
July 8, 1954, The Cleveland Press: 
"HUSBAND PUTS $10,000 UP FOR SLAYER" 
July 9, 1954, The Cleveland Plain Dealer: 
"TEXT OF DOCTOR'S STATEMENT ON HIS OFFER OF 
REWARD" 
July 9, 1954, The Cleveland Plain Dealer: 
I 
"DOCTOR WILL HELP IN HUNT FOR DEATH WEAPON 
TODAY" 
July 10, 1954, The Cleveland News: 
"HONORED ATHLETE AT HEIGHTS HIGH" 
July 12, 1954, The Cleveland Press: 
"DR. SHEPPARD RETURNS TO BAY VIEW HOSPITAL 
TO TREAT HIS PATIENTS" 
July 15, 1954, The Cleveland News: 
"DRUNK 'CONFESSES' BUT STORY FIZZLES" 
July 17, 1954, The Cleveland Press: 
"DR. SHEPPARD TELLS PRESS 'KILLER WILL BE 
CAUGHT'" 
(Then follows responses to 11 questions.) 
July 31, 1954, The Cleveland Press: 
"TEXT OF STATEMENT BY CORRIGAN AFTER ARREST 
OF CLIENT, DR. SAM" 
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July 31, 1954, The Cleveland News: 
"POLICE CORDIAL, POLITE AS THEY TAKE SHEP-
PARD" 
August 13, 1954, The Cleveland Plain Dealer: 
"FAMILY POINTS TO BAY MAN AS NEW SUSPECT 
AS HOVERSTEN TALKS" 
August 19, 1954, The Cleveland Press: 
"DR. SAM IS ANXIOUS TO TAKE STAND, HIS BROTHER 
SAYS" 
September 14, 1954, The Cleveland News: 
"BATTLES PROWLER IN BAY. CORRIGAN LINKS 
BOY'S STORY WITH SHEPPARD CASE" 
September 17, 1954, The Cleveland News: 
"DR. STEVE HITS 'RED HERRING' ACCUSATION" 
October 19, 1954, The Cleveland Press: 
"WRITER FINDS DR. SAM'S LOOKS BIG ASSET FOR 
ACTOR CORRIGAN" 
October 21, 1954, The Cleveland Press: 
"DR. SAM JUST LIKE A BROTHER, 2 SISTERS-IN-LAW 
SAY AT TRIAL" 
October 22, 1954, The Cleveland Plain Dealer: 
"CORRIGAN RATED SECOND DARROW" 
October 25, 1954, The Cleveland Plain Dealer: 
" 'OTHER SIDE' OF CORRIGAN LIES IN POETRY" 
(With picture of W. J. Corrigan and his writer 
daughter.) 
October 26, 1954, The Cleveland Plain Dealer: 
"COURT PSYCHOLOGISTS SEE TRIAL CROWD AS 
NORMALLY CURIOUS" 
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October 26, The Cleveland Press: 
"SAM, WOMAN JUROR SOB IN COURT" 
October 27, 1954, The Cleveland Press: 
"CITY CHEMIST AIDS DEFENSE OF DR. SAM" 
October 28, 1954, The Cleveland Press: 
"JUROR OUT, ADMITS SHE WAS FOR SAM" 
November 4, 1954, The Cleveland News: 
"LETTERS WRITTEN IN JAIL BARE SHEPPARD FEEL-
INGS" 
November 5, 1954, The Cleveland Press: 
"DR. SAM SAYS AUTOPSY BUNGLED" 
November 9, 1954, The Cleveland Plain Dealer: 
"CORRIGAN MUSES ON TRIAL'S DRAMA" 
November 10, 1954, The Cleveland Press: 
"GARMONE QUIZZING WILTS MAYOR HOUK" 
November 11, 1954, The Cleveland News: 
"HOUKS HELP DR. SAM AS MUCH AS THEY HURT" 
November 11, 1954, The Cleveland News: 
"DEATH HOME OPENED TO DR. SAM'S KIN" 
November 13, 1954, The Cleveland News: 
"CORRIGAN'S STRATEGY SCORES" 
November 15, 1954, The Cleveland News: 
"CORRIGAN HAMMERS AT DRENKHAN" 
November 16, 1954, The Cleveland News: 
"CORONER IS VILLAIN OF CORRIGAN PIECE" 
November 17, 1954, The Cleveland News: 
"DR. STEVE HITS PRINT THEORY; SAYS BLOOD 
FLOWED INTO FOLD" 
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November 17, 1954, The Cleveland Press: 
"DR. SAM WRITES TO HIS SON" 
(Photo of Letter.) 
November 18, 1954, The Cleveland News: 
"DR. SAM DISPLAYS NO-WEAPON THEORY" 
(With picture demonstration.) 
November 19, 1954, The Cleveland Plain Dealer: 
"DR. STEVE'S TIP IS EX-PATIENT" 
November 19, 1954, The Cleveland News: 
"ORDERED HOVERSTEN OUT, DR. STEVE SAYS" 
November 19, 1954, The Cleveland Press: 
"SEEK STEVE'S 'SUSPECT' IN DETROIT" 
November 20, 1954, The Cleveland Press: 
"SCHOTTKE AIDED SAM: DR. STEVE" 
November 22, 1954, The Cleveland Plain Dealer: 
"PROBE NEW BAY TIP; DETROIT MAN CLEAR" 
November 22, 1954, The Cleveland News: 
"SLAYING 'SUSPECT' IS WRITTEN OFF" 
December 2, 1954, The Cleveland News: 
"EVIDENCE CHANGED: DR. STEVE" 
December 4, 1954, The Cleveland News: 
"CHIP PAYS CALL ON STORE SANTA" 
December 7, 1954, The Cleveland News: 
"DR. SAM THANKS REPORTER" 
During the trial most of the publicity was given out 
by the defense. As a former newspaper man, defense 
counsel knew very well how to get favorable stories in the 
public press, and he was quite successful. He held press 
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conferences daily, and frequently more than once each day; 
and, with his client, posed for hundreds of pictures which, 
together with favorable personal stories, appeared in all 
types of news media. The amount of publicity so put out 
by the defense was enormous, and far outshadowed the 
attention given the State. Defense counsel found that by 
continually denouncing the newspapers and public officials, 
he could get an even greater amount of publicity. Mr. 
Corrigan's skill in the art of publicity is demonstrated by 
the innumerable stories that appeared, emanating from the 
petitioner, his counsel, his relatives and his friends. Dr. 
Steve Sheppard, petitioner's brother, and a prospective 
witness, so persisted in trying to have the petitioner's case 
tried in the newspapers that the trial court was required to 
admonish him that if he did not desist he, being a witness, 
would be excluded from the courtroom. The bales of news-
papers offered by the defense in support of their motions 
show these favorable personal stories and the innumerable 
photographs for which the petitioner and his counsel posed. 
Mr. Corrigan also demonstrated his accomplishments 
as an actor by pretending to object to the pictures and 
reading his objection into the record. The photographs 
themselves, and the stories which accompanied them, show 
complete acquiescence and pleasure. That the objection 
made for the record was without justification and mere 
pretense is proved by the testimony of Julian Wilson dur-
ing the hearing on the motion for new trial. Mr. Wilson 
was a photographer for the Associated Press, assigned to 
this trial, and testified that he made many pictures of Dr. 
Sam Sheppard and considerably over a hundred of Mr. 
Corrigan (R. 7088). His testimony speaks for itself: 
"Q. Now, did you take any pictures in this court 
room while the court was in session? 
A. No, sir, I did not. 
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Q. Now, while the court was not in session, dur-
ing recess or after adjournment, did you take pictures 
in this court room and around this building? 
A. Many times. 
Q. Did you take pictures of Mr. Corrigan? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. About how many times? 
A. Roughly-it would run considerably over a 
hundred negatives. 
Q. About a hundred negatives. And of Dr. Sam 
Sheppard? 
A. I made many pictures of him. 
Q. And Mr. Garmone? 
A. He, too, I have made many pictures of. 
Q. Now, did Mr. Corrigan ever object to your 
taking of any of these pictures? 
A. A few times he has objected. 
Q. When was that? 
A. About the middle of the trial or towards the 
end of it, Mr. Corrigan-we were instructed that Mr. 
Corrigan didn't want any pictures made of himself, 
the defense, or the defendant. 
Q. How many pictures had you taken without 
his objection before you received those instructions? 
A. Oh, many. 
Q. More than 50? 
A. I'd think so. 
Q. And after you received the instructions, did 
you stop taking pictures? 
A. Yes, sir. 
0. And how long did that continue? 
A. About a week and a half, two weeks. 
Q. Then what occurred? 
A. We asked Mr. Corrigan's permission. 
Q. And did you get it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And then resumed taking pictures? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. How many pictures did you resume taking-
did you take after you resumed taking those pictures? 
A. I'd say not as many as before because we 
didn't need as many pictures. 
Q. More than 20 or 25? 
A. About that. 
Q. Now, with respect to the defendant, Dr. Sam 
Sheppard, is the number of pictures that you took 
before the objection by Mr. Corrigan about the same 
as what you took of Mr. Corrigan? 
A. About, yes. 
Q. You took about 50 before. Then there was 
this period when you didn't take any pictures because 
of the objection, is that correct? 
A. That's true, sir. 
Q. And then did you later resume? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. With whose permission? 
A. Well, when we got Mr. Corrigan's permission, 
we resumed taking pictures. 
Q. And about how many did you take after you 
got permission? 
A. Somewhere around 15, 20, 25. 
* * * * * 
Q. Did you ever take a picture of either Dr. Sam 
Sheppard or any of his counsel over their objection? 
A. No, sir. 
* * * * * 
The Court: May I have just one question? Were 
you present at the conference which the Court had 
with photographers prior to the opening of the case? 
The Witness: Yes, sir, I was. 
The Court: And at which the Court stated what 
the rule would be as to taking pictures during the 
trial? 
The Witness: I was. 
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The Court: Do you recall what that was as to 
taking pictures within the court room and of the 
defendant and his counsel? 
The Witness: Yes, I do recall. 
The Court: All right. State it. 
The Witness: Your ruling, sir, was that no pic-
tures would be made at any time when the court was 
in session, and you also requested that we make no 
pictures of the defendant or the defense or anyone 
without their permission. I believe that is the gist of 
the thing. 
The Court: That's correct." (R. 7087-7091.) 
It is obvious from the record that Mr. Corrigan's ob-
jections, if any, were quite proforma and mere pretense. 
Counsel for the petitioner applied for a continuance 
of the trial to "permit the extraordinary publicity to quiet 
down." The trial did not start until October 18th and 
counsel for the petitioner had been engaged in the case 
within hours following the crime on the 4th of July. It was 
not claimed that they were not prepared for trial and, as 
the Trial Court stated: "nor was any suggestion made as 
to who was going to quiet down the publicity, nor when, 
nor how." (Pet. App. p. 4a.) This application was there-
fore properly overruled. 
There is no question but that there was a great deal 
of public interest in this case. It should not be necessary 
to point out that newspapers have a constitutional right to 
report events in the community and to criticize what ap-
pears to them to be laxity on the part of public officials. 
Defense counsel have seen fit to devote a considerable 
portion of their brief to criticism of public officials; surely, 
the newspapers have an equal right. The Trial Court put 
it very succinctly when he stated in ruling upon the motion 
for new trial: 
\ 
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"It is to be noted that not a single person or agency 
connected with the investigation of, or prosecution, 
for the crime involved escapes the anathema of the 
defense. These include the police, the Coroner, his 
assistants, the prosecuting attorney and his aides, the 
State's witnesses, the Grand Jury, its foreman, the 
trial jury, the public, the bailiffs and the Court. The 
sense of search for truth and the declaration of justice 
seems to have vanished from a whole community as if 
by magic and overnight. 
The news agencies of every kind and character 
are thrown in for good measure. In spite of all the 
charges made, not a single specific item is cited in 
support of the claims made. Only broad generalities 
are indulged in. Reviewing courts will, we hope, have 
the duty of passing on all the legal questions involved 
and appearing on the record, and unless it is shown 
in very clear fashion that some extrinsic forces plowed 
through the effort to grant the defendant a fair trial, 
and succeeded in disrupting that effort, it is fair to 
assume that none did." (Pet. App. pp. 15a-16a.) 
There is a comparatively recent decision of the Su-
preme Court of the United States which states succinctly 
the right of the people. In Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, 
374, the Court said: 
"A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court-
room is public property * * * Those who see and 
hear what transpired can report it with impunity. 
There is no special perquisite of the judiciary which 
enables it, as distinguished from other institutions of 
democratic government to suppress, edit or censor 
events which transpire in proceedings before it." 
The right of the people in this respect was recognized more 
recently in the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in 
Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U. S. 912, 920: 
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"One of the demands of a democratic society is that the 
public should know what goes on in courts by being 
told by the press what happens there, to the end that 
the public may judge whether our system of criminal 
justice is fair and right." 
The only question with respect to the motion for 
change of venue was, could a fair and impartial jury be 
impaneled in this community, where the offense occurred? 
The question was answered by the impaneling of the jury. 
A fair and impartial jury was impaneled, even though the 
defense did not exhaust their peremptory challenges, either 
as to the first 12 jurors or as to the alternate jurors. 
As stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio in this case: 
"At the outset of the trial, in response to defend-
ant's motion for change of venue, the trial court said: 
'The motion for change of venue will be held in 
abeyance, and we will proceed at 1: 15 this after-
noon in an effort to determine whether or not we 
can secure a fair and impartial jury. If we are not 
able to do that, there will be no question in this 
court's mind at all but what this case ought to go 
out of Cuyahoga County, whatever may be the 
effect of that.' 
"At the conclusion of the impaneling of 12 jurors, 
the motion for change of venue was renewed (for the 
third time) , at which time, in overruling the motion, 
the trial court said: 
'That the best evidence in the world is the effort 
to select a jury, and what we get here in a picture 
that has taken almost two weeks of time. The court 
is thoroughly satisfied that we have here a fair and 
impartial group of people to try this case, and I 
doubt if under any conditions at any time anywhere 
in this state you could have a better looking group 
of people and a more intelligent group of people, 
25 
as a whole, to try a case of this kind, and the court 
is thoroughly satisfied that they are a group of fair 
and impartial people who can properly try this 
case under the guidance of the court, and I hope 
we will be able to give them that in the manner that 
it ought to be given.' 
"The same motion, advanced for the same reason 
' 
was renewed on five other occasions during the trial, 
and the trial court in each instance overruled the 
motion. 
"We believe the trial court was justified in those 
rulings. In Townsend v. State, 17 C. C. (N. S.), 380, 
25 C. D. 408, affirmed without written opinion in 88 
Ohio St. 584, 106 N. E. 1083, it is said: 
'The examination of jurors on their voir dire 
affords the best test as to whether or not prejudice 
exists in the community against the defendant; and 
where it appears that the opinions as to the guilt 
of the defendant of those called for examination 
for jurors are based on newspaper articles and that 
the opinions so formed are not fixed but would 
yield readily to evidence, it is not error to overrule 
an application for a change of venue.' 
"For example, in Richards v. State, 43 Ohio App. 
212, 183 N. E. 36, it was held that the exercise of the 
right to order a change of venue lies in the trial court's 
discretion, and that a refusal to order a change of 
venue without prejudice until it can be determined 
whether a fair and impartial jury can be impaneled is 
not an abuse of discretion. See also, Dorger v. State, 
40 Ohio App. 415, 179 N. E. 143; State v. Stemen, 90 
Ohio App. 309, 106 N. E. (2d) 662; State v. Deem, 
154 Ohio St. 576, 97 N. E. (2d) 13. 
"If the jury system is to remain a part of our sys-
tem of jurisprudence, the courts and litigants must 
have faith in the inherent honesty of our citizens in 
performing their duty as jurors courageously and 
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without fear or favor. Of the 75 prospective jurors 
called pursuant to this venire only 14 were excused 
because they had formed a firm opinion as to the guilt 
or innocence of the defendant. A full panel was ac-
cepted before this venire was exhausted, and defend-
ant exercised but five of his allotted six peremptory 
challenges. 
"In the light of these facts, and particularly in the 
light of the fact that a jury was impaneled and sworn 
to try this case fairly and impartially on the evidence 
and the law, this Court cannot say that the denial of 
a change of venue by the trial judge constituted an 
abuse of discretion." (Pet. App. pp. 87a-89a.) 
The process of impaneling the jury demonstrated the 
wisdom of the foregoing rules and there was no unusual 
difficulty in securing a fair and impartial jury. The analy-
sis of this process is briefly stated in the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals as follows: 
"The record in this case discloses that a special 
venire was called for the trial of this defendant as 
provided by Sec. 2945.18 R. C. Seventy-five names 
were drawn from the jury box. Of this number, 11 
were immediately excused for justifiable reasons or 
were not found, and counld not be summoned (three 
in number) by the sheriff. Of the remaining 64, 13 
were excused because they had formed a firm opinion 
as to the guilt or innocence of the accused and 10 
were likewise excused because they were opposed to 
capital punishment. Sixteen others were excused for 
cause. 
"The State used four peremptory challenges and 
the defendant five. As is provided in Sec. 2945.21 
the State in a homicide case where there is but one 
defendant, is entitled to six such peremptory chal-
lenges and the defendant a like number so that when 
the jury was sworn, the defendant left the right to one 
peremptory challenge unused. From the foregoing 
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analysis of the venire of 75 electors called in this case, 
four of those called were not needed in impaneling a 
jury of 12. Such jury was selected as provided by law 
and sworn and accepted by the defendant to well and 
truly try and true deliverance make between the 
State and the defendant. 
"The parties agreed to select two alternate jurors 
as provided by Sec. 2313.37 R. C. The four remain-
ing jurors of the original list, together with an addi-
tional venire of 24 summoned as provided by law, 
were used for this purpose. Of the 24 summoned, 
eight were called and questioned together with the 
four from the original venire, in impaneling the two 
alternate jurors. Of those examined, three were ex-
cused for holding a firm opinion of the guilt or in-
nocence of the accused, four were excused as being 
against capital punishment, one was excused on chal-
lenge for cause and each side used one peremptory 
challenge. (Each side had the right to excuse two 
prospective alternate jurors peremptorily under the 
provisions of Sec. 2313.37 R. C.) 
"The analysis of the impaneling of the jury in this 
case where but 16 prospective jurors out of 72 ex-
amined could not sit because they had prejudged the 
guilt or innocence of the accused, clearly shows that 
there was no difficulty whatever in impaneling a fair 
and impartial jury. 
"The jury having been impaneled as provided by 
law and sworn to afford the defendant a fair and im-
partial trial, and to come to its verdict by a considera-
tion of the evidence submitted in open court without 
any outside influence or consideration, and where 
there is no claim of misconduct on the part of any 
member of such jury during the trial, there can be 
no ground to claim a mistrial because of continued 
publicity, publicizing the events of the trial, and 
other related matters." (Pet. App. pp. 34a-36a.) 
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In their discussion on publicity and the fact that a 
number of jurors had read about the case before their 
voir dire examination, Juror Barrish is mentioned (Pet. 
Br. p. 35) together with the reason he gave for having 
read about the case. 
The further extended examination of Juror Barrish 
by both parties is omitted from the petition and the de-
fense omit to state that they accepted Juror Barrish by 
passing him for cause (R. 115) and that they had per-
emptory challenges which they chose not to exercise. 
The fact that prospective jurors had read something 
about the case before they were sworn as jurors did not 
necessarily disqualify them. We know of no principle of 
law which excludes such jurors from service merely be-
cause they had previously read or heard something about 
the case. The persons who could hear the evidence with-
out bias or prejudice and could decide the issues fairly 
and impartially were seated. Those who could not, were 
excused. 
The defense try to make capital out of the efforts to 
solve this murder, especially in the weeks following July 
4.th. Naturally, the public authorities would check out 
every tip, good or bad. The same may be said for the 
newspapers, and if the petitioner and his lawyers pursued 
a course of conduct that was not in accord with protesta-
tions of innocence, comment by newspapers and others 
was inevitable. 
The mere suggestion that the petitioner, who was 
protesting his innocence, submit himself to certain tests 
(Pet. Br. pp. 22, 23) deprived him of no constitutional 
right nor prevented him from having a fair trial. He was 
not forced to take any test and he did not submit to any 
test. Also discussed by petitioner under the subject mat-
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ter of publicity is the evidence received with respect to 
the conversations had with the petitioner on the question 
of the lie detector test. 
When the subject of the lie detector was first pre-
sented in the questioning of Officer Schottke and he re-
lated the conversation he had had with the petitioner per-
taining to the lie detector, no objection was made to the 
admission of those conversations (R. 3590) . 
The trial court instructed the jury that a person is 
not compelled to take a lie detector test (R. 3852). The 
petitioner himself on direct examination in response to 
questions asked by his counsel, Mr. Corrigan, related his 
conversations with Officers Schottke and Gareau pertain-
ing to the lie detector test (R. 6298-6299). 
In the argument to the jury, defense counsel said: 
"And then during the course of that conversation 
he (Officer Schottke) says, 'Are you willing to take 
a lie detector test?' 
"And what was the answer that this man gave? 
He says, 'I am.'" (Record, pp. 5376-77.)* 
Such a claim in the argument was, of course, wholly un-
justified in the light of the testimony of Officer Schottke 
and Deputy Sheriff Rossbach, who were continually put 
off by the petitioner and the petitioner never did take the 
test. The statement of petitioner in the brief that there 
was objection to these conversations is entirely untrue 
(R. 3590). 
The police and other public authorities are severely 
criticized for trying to obtain a "confession" from the 
petitioner. (Pet. Br. pp. 29-31.) What is unconstitutional 
about the police endeavoring to secure a confession? No 
* Typewritten Record. Original Bill of Exceptions filed in 
Washington. 
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one laid a hand on the petitioner and the most that can be 
claimed is that some officer used some bad words. 
Much is made of the use of the words "third degree" 
in a newspaper editorial, but it should be remembered that 
that expression is .frequently applied to a thorough inter-
rogation and does not at all necessarily mean the use of 
force or violence. In any event, there was no force or 
violence used. Defense counsel must have been fearful 
that a confession might have been obtained. How else can 
they explain the extraordinary effort they made to prevent 
the petitioner from being interrbgated except by friendly 
officers under stipulated conditions? How else can they ex-
plain their "sit down strike" in the county jail on Sunday, 
August 1st, 1954, when counsel appeared at approximately 
8: 15 o'clock in the morning and, by alternating one with 
the other, remained with the petitioner until afternoon, to 
prevent the interrogation of their client by the officers who 
were obliged to cool their heels downstairs during the en-
tire period of time? And when the sheriff, noting that 
counsel was merely reading a newspaper, requested the 
attorneys to leave, the defense bitterly assailed him, charg-
ing him with violations of law and of the constitution. 
They even saw fit to make charges against the sheriff to 
the Bar Association and at a subsequent hearing thereon 
before the bar committee, counsel who made the charge 
did not even extend to them the courtesy of an appearance. 
We should also note that later that same Sunday, after 
some police officers had futilely interrogated the petitioner, 
they were asked to leave by the sheriff in order that he be 
revisited by Messrs. Corrigan and Petersilge. The officers 
got nowhere in trying to question the petitioner and no 
confession was obtained. So what point is there in dwelling 
upon the subject matter of "confession"? 
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The defense also dwell on newspaper editorials critical 
of the progress that was being made in the solution of this 
horrible crime (Pet. Br. p. 24). It must be remembered 
that the Mayor of Bay Village was a close personal friend 
of the defendant, as were the police officers in Bay Village 
for whom he was the police surgeon; that he was whisked 
off to Bay View Hospital by his brothers without permis-
sion before the Coroner or any of the Cleveland police of-
ficers arrived; that a protective shield was thrown around 
him and that the defendant and his counsel would permit 
no interrogation except under their own terms and by 
designated friendly officers; and that the defendant and 
his counsel were obstructing the public authorities in what 
should be the normal investigation of a murder. It seemed, 
at least to the newspaper editors, that certain public offi-
cials were "sitting on their hands" and were fearful, for 
one reason or another, of proceeding vigorously in the in-
vestigation as they would in any other case. Certainly, 
these newspapers have a right to criticize what they deem 
to be laxity on the part of public officials. It is a right given 
them by the same constitution which assures the defendant 
a fair trial by jury. Whether we or defense counsel agree 
or disagree with the opinions expressed by the newspaper 
editors is entirely beside the point. 
The defense refer to the inquest held in the school 
auditorium in Bay Village and again proceed to distort the 
nature of the proceedings and what occurred (Pet. Br. pp. 
24-26). Ignored entirely is the testimony of Dr. Gerber 
that he had made arrangements for the inquest and had 
actually issued subpoenas before the Press editorial ap-
peared, and that the reason it was held in Bay Village was 
that most of the witnesses lived there and it would be con-
venient for them. Also untold is the fact that the hearing 
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was in perfect order during the testimony of the petitioner, 
his parents, his brothers, the doctors, Don Ahern and 
Nancy Ahern, Mayor and Mrs. Houk and the Bay Village 
officers. There was no disorder until the last few minutes 
of the last day of the public hearing when Dorothy Shep-
pard was recalled to testify further. It was brought about 
by Mr. Corrigan, counsel for petitioner, who sought to 
direct the reporter to insert certain matter into the record. 
Mr. Corrigan was told not to do so and was cautioned that 
if he persisted, he would be asked to leave. He not only 
persisted, but ordered the reporter to make the insertions 
in the record, refused to desist when so requested, refused 
to sit down when so requested and challenged the author-
ity of the Coroner to put him out. The Coroner had no 
alternative and was obliged to have Mr. Corrigan removed 
from the hearing room. This occurred within a few minutes 
before the close of the hearing. Furthermore, the inquest 
was held on July 22nd, 23rd and 26th and there was at 
that time no indictment of the petitioner. The indictment 
came later, and the trial did not start until October 18th. 
The disturbance at the inquest which Mr. Corrigan created 
has no possible bearing on the trial of this case, nor did it 
prevent the defendant from having a fair trial. 
The petitioner states that he was taken from the jail 
and subjected to personal indignities (Pet. Br. p. 31). This 
is completely without foundation in fact. The defendant 
had complained of injuries and he was taken to the Cleve-
land City Hospital where he was given a complete and 
thorough physical examination. Nowhere in the testimony 
of the petitioner himself does he assert that he was abused 
by the doctors. The procedure of "pricking a patient with 
a pin" is merely to test the patient's reflexes and there is 
nothing abusive in this practice, so commonly used. 
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The petitioner dwells on various matters (Pet. Br. pp. 
32, 34) preliminary to this trial, including his own applica-
tions for writs of prohibition, habeas corpus, etc., all of 
which have no bearing whatever on the trial of this cause. 
On page 34 of the petitioner's brief, it is asserted that 
the indictment was the result of pressure on the Grand 
Jury. This statement is based solely on an expression of 
the foreman, Mr. Winston, that "pressure on us has been 
enormous." The complete answer of the foreman explain-
ing the "pressure" was as follows: 
"Q. What was the pressure that was placed on 
you? 
A. Only curious people who wanted to know 
what we knew on the Grand Jury." (Emphasis ours.) 
The pressure was for information and not, as suggested by 
defense counsel, to indict the petitioner. 
Complaint is made (Pet. Br., pp. 40-41) relative to 
the part taken by the Trial Court in a Fabian television 
program on the steps of the Court House. The trial judge, 
on one morning, walked toward the Court House steps 
as usual, and there saw Robert Fabian (a retired Super-
intendent of Scotland Yard) with a very small contraption 
in his hand. Mr. Fabian said, "Good morning, Judge 
Blythin, nice morning." The judge said, "Good morning, 
Mr. Fabian." (Pet. App., pp. 13a-14a.) There was no con-
versation of any kind about the case on trial or any other 
subject. 
At pages 41-42 of the petition, the defense recount 
the incident of a newspaper reporter visiting the home of 
Lois Mancini, an interview with Mrs. Mancini's mother, 
husband and children, and of the pictures taken of the 
members of the family, together with a story of the diffi-
culties of the family while the mother was serving on the 
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jury. There may be some question as to the good taste of 
such a story, but in any event it did not favor one side or 
the other and was entirely without prejudice to the defend-
ant. Furthermore, Lois Mancini was not present during 
the visit of the reporter and did not participate in the 
interview. We wish to also note that she was merely an 
alternate juror and did not participate in the deliberations 
or the verdict. 
It is urged that during the trial there was a broadcast 
by Walter Winchell (Pet. Br. p. 42), in which he related 
the story of a woman in New York who claimed she had 
been a mistress of Sam Sheppard. At the request of de-
fense counsel the court inquired of the jurors whether they 
had heard this Winchell broadcast and two jurors re-
sponded that they had. The jurors had no knowledge that 
Mr. Winchell was to broadcast anything at all pertaining 
to the Sheppard case or to Sam Sheppard. The two jurors 
who heard the broadcast were asked by the Court: "Would 
that have any effect on your judgment?" Both answered, 
"No." The Court stated: 
"I do hope, ladies-I would like to ask if any of 
you know if any members of your families heard the 
broadcast? 
"Have any of you, other than these two ladies, 
heard anything about that broadcast last night? And 
I wish to ask you two ladies in particular, and all of 
you in general, to pay no attention whatever to that 
kind of scavenging. It has no place, in my judgment, 
on the air at all, but that is not for me to determine, 
but surely it has no place whatever in our thinking or 
considerations or thoughts in any way, shape or man-
ner in this case. Let's confine ourselves to this court 
room, if you please." (R. 5429-30.) 
Urged for the first time in the Supreme Court of Ohio 
as error was the refusal of the trial court on motion for 
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continuance in the 5th week of trial to ask the jurors if 
they heard a broadcast by Bob Considine over Station 
WHK in which there was something said about the testi-
mony in the Sheppard case (Pet. Br. p. 41). This matter 
was brought up in the court's chambers and neither the 
court nor the prosecutors had any knowledge whatsoever 
of the alleged broadcast. Mr. Corrigan, counsel for the pe-
titioner, complained that Bob Considine had paralleled a 
denial of the petitioner as set forth by Officer Schottke 
with a denial of Alger Hiss when he was confronted by 
Whittaker Chambers, without stating that Dr. Sheppard 
was in bed in the hospital at the time of his denial, while 
Mr. Hiss was strong, mentally and physically. 
Apart from this assertion of counsel, no proof what-
ever was submitted to the court as to the exact nature of 
the broadcast, although Mr. Considine was available it 
' being conceded by the defense that he was in daily at-
tendance at the trial. When the court stated: "We are not 
going to harass the jury every morning," Mr. Corrigan 
then responded, "I can't help it, Judge. If you don't, that's 
all right with me. I make my exception." (R. 3725.) 
Upon the hearing on the motion for new trial and 
even though several of the jurors had been subpoenaed, 
the defense produced not a word of testimony to support 
their present claim that the jurors heard this broadcast. 
There is in the record not one particle of evidence that any 
of the jurors were influenced by this broadcast or the so-
called Winchell broadcast or by anything else other than 
the evidence produced in open court. 
That it was not error for the court to refuse to inter-
rogate or poll the jurors during the trial as to whether they 
had read a newspaper article or heard a radio broadcast 
such as the Considine broadcast, is affirmed by the annota-
tion in 15 A. L. R. (2) 1152, wherein it is stated: 
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"The present annotation is concerned with the 
question of whether, during a criminal trial, the jurors 
may be interrogated or polled as to whether they have 
read newspaper articles pertaining to the alleged 
crime or the trial. As the title indicates, the annota-
tion involves the propriety of interrogation or polling 
after impanelment, as distinguished from that which 
occurs on voir dire examination. 
"The few cases that involve this specific point all 
uphold the trial court where it refuses to interrogate, 
or refuses to let a party interrogate, the jurors as to 
the reading of newspaper articles relating to the trial 
or the crime. The decisions generally turn on the fact 
that the trial court had instructed the jury not to read 
the articles or that there had been no showing by the 
moving party that the jurors had in fact read them." 
Complaint is made that the jurors were photographed 
on several occasions and "during deliberations" (Pet. Br., 
p. 44) . It is, of course, not the fact that they were photo-
graphed during deliberations. 
On the motion for new trial, the trial court stated: 
"Jurors were fl.ash-photographed in their comings 
and goings and it is difficult to know how that can be 
prevented even if, indeed, it should be. Jurors are 
human beings and become citizens of special im-
portance when undertaking a signal public service. 
Not a single complaint was registered by any juror in 
this connection and it is worthy of note that the de-
fense does not even claim that any juror was affected 
in the least by it. Furthermore, they were not fl.ashed 
by agents of the State nor on its behalf. Such ex-
posures to public attention are not matters of preju-
dice for or against either the State or defendant but 
matters of news interest to newspapers. They remain 
wholly neutral if fed sufficient news or pictures of 
interest." (Pet. App., pp. 8a-9a.) 
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The Trial Court stated further on the hearing on the 
motion for new trial: 
"While this Court would not for the world mini-
mize the importance of guarding this jury-or the 
jury in any other case-from annoyance or influence, 
he must express the thought that human beings, 
whether serving as jurors or not, cannot be wrapped 
in cellophane and deposited in a cooler during trial 
and deliberation. 
"The jury in the instant case was jealously guarded 
throughout the entire proceedings and it is worthy 
of note-and indeed decisive in this Court's judg-
ment, that not a suggestion of influence upon the jury 
is forthcoming from any person or agency. Inter-
ference or influence must be the test. If we are to 
convict jurors without a scintilla of evidence of un-
due influence on them, it is now pertinent to halt 
and ask ourselves what becomes of our faith in our 
decent fellow-citizens and of what value is the jury 
system at all. 
"It is claimed that the jurors were permitted to 
separate on one or two occasions within the period of 
their deliberations and were so photographed. Fore-
man Bird and Bailiff Francis testified that the so-
called separation of jurors was merely their mo-
mentary division in the dining room of the hotel for 
the purpose of photographing the men in one group 
and the women in the other. It was in the presence 
of the two bailiffs, was only a few feet in extent and 
there was no communication of any kind with the jury 
by the photographer. To term such a petty detail a 
'separation' is stretching the imagination to a danger-
ous point. It certainly is not the separation prohibited 
by law and is hardly worthy of serious thought or 
comment. 
"The Court had complete confidence in the jury in 
this case; it was protected at all times from any pos-
38 
sible approach, and its every movement and conduct 
would seem to be an eloquent demonstration of the 
fact that it proved itself worthy of the confidence 
placed in it to faithfully carry out the admittedly 
tremendous responsibilities entrusted to it." (Pet. 
App. 12a-13a.) 
Much is made at pages 45-46 of the petitioner's brief 
of "Disorder During the Trial." Counsel complains that 
there were instances of disorder, noise and laughter in the 
court room. It should be remembered that this trial con-
tinued for some nine weeks and that necessarily there are 
times when people are required, for one reason or another, 
to leave the court room. A few of these occurrences caused 
the Court to admonish the spectators to the end that there 
be no interruption of the trial proceedings. There are, of 
course, the inevitable traffic noises on East 21st Street in 
Cleveland which result in short delays or repetition of the 
questions. 
As to the incident of the laughter to which Mr. Cor-
rigan refers (Pet. Br., p. 46), it resulted from Mr. Cor-
rigan's remark, "~ell, I don't care what the conversation 
was," after he had asked the witness what the substance 
of a conversation was, and the witness had given his 
answer. 
Counsel complains of the presence and conduct of 
unnamed persons in and about the court room and cor-
ridors during the five days in which the jury was deliber-
ating in their jury room (Pet. Br., p. 49). If the unnamed 
persons interested in the outcome of the trial, whether 
they be newspaper men, counsel for the defendant, the 
defendant's brothers, Dr. Steve Sheppard and Dr. Richard 
Sheppard, their respective wives and friends or other 
spectators, milled around during the five days, or if some 
of them played cards during the long wait, we fail to see 
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how that in any way influenced the jury in its delibera-
tions or had any bearing on the verdict. There is not a 
scintilla of evidence in the record that the jury was dis-
turbed or influenced by any of the activities in the court 
room or in the corridors while they were in their jury 
room during their deliberations. 
Petitioner has presented nothing by way of affirma-
tive evidence to show that the court or jury had been im-
properly influenced by publicity or anything else. The 
burden is upon them to do so. Section 2945.83 of the Re-
vised Code of Ohio, governing the state courts on review, 
provides: 
"No motion for a new trial shall be granted or 
verdict set aside, nor shall any judgment of conviction 
be reversed in any court because of: 
* * * 
"(C) The admission or rejection of any evidence 
offered against or for the accused unless it affirma-
tively appears on the record that the accused was or 
may have been prejudiced thereby; 
* * * 
"(E) Any other cause unless it appears affirma-
tively from the record that the accused was preju-
diced thereby or was prevented from having a fair 
trial." 
This rule in Ohio is in conformity with the ruling of this 
Court as expressed in United States v. Handy, 351 U. S. 
454: 
"While this Court stands ready to correct viola-
tions of constitutional rights, it also holds that "it is 
not asking too much that the burden of showing essen-
tial unfairness be sustained by him who claims such 
injustice and seeks to have the result set aside, and 
that it be sustained not as a matter of speculation but 
as a demonstrable reality.' 
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"See also, Adams v. United States, 317 U. S. 269, 
281, 87 L. Ed. 268, 276, 63 S. Ct. 236, 143 ALR 435; 
Buchalter v. New York, 319 U.S. 427, 431, 87 L. Ed. 
1492, 1496, 63 S. Ct. 1129; Stroble v. California, 343 
U. S. 181, 198, 96 L. Ed. 872, 885, 72 S. Ct. 599." 
This Court pointed out in the Handy case that Justice 
Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court in Holt v. United 
States, 218 U.S. 245, 251, 54 L. Ed. 1021, 1029, 31 S. Ct. 
2, 20 Ann. Cas. 1138, cautioned that: 
"If the mere opportunity for prejudice or cor-
ruption is to raise a presumption that they exist, it 
will be hard to maintain jury trial under the condi-
tions of the present day." 
OTHER MATTERS SET FORTH IN APPLICATION OF PE-
TITIONER DID NOT DEPRIVE HIM OF DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW, NOR, WHEN THE FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
ARE CORRECTLY STATED, WAS THERE ANY ERROR 
IN THE RULINGS OF THE COURT. 
III. 
As to Juror Manning (Pet. Br. pp. 50-52) and his 
replacement by the alternate juror. 
After Juror Manning was seated and sworn as a juror, 
a young man came to the Criminal Courts Building, talked 
to counsel for the defendant first and later to the Prose-
cutor, and informed them that Juror Manning had been 
arrested and convicted of a morals offense relating to a 
young man. The matter was also brought to the attention 
of the Court. Manning neglected to make this conviction 
known when he was asked on the voir dire examination 
whether or not he had ever appeared as a witness in any 
case. The matter became known generally and received 
considerable publicity. A meeting was held in chambers 
and by common consent the matter was continued over 
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the weekend. Counsel for the defense thereafter proposed 
that he would consent to the discharge of Juror Manning 
if the entire panel was discharged and we would proceed 
to re-impanel the jury. This proposal was declined by the 
State. 
After the alternate jurors were impaneled, Juror Man-
ning addressed himself to the Court in open court and 
stated: 
"Juror Manning: Right now, I mean from what is 
going on, when I came down here for jury duty I 
thought I was doing what a public spirited citizen of 
this country would do. That's the only idea I had 
when I came down. It interfered with my work, my 
earning a living. I didn't give a second thought to 
that. I came down here, and if I was chosen, I would 
serve and serve in the way I spoke, absolutely un-
biasedly. And I was-I tried to run myself from the 
heart and mind together and be absolutely unbiased 
and unprejudiced in thinking and talking with other 
people, even speaking outside this jury. But after 
what has happened, I would not be able to sit in that 
box with the other jurors, be able to listen to the case 
and be unbiased, unprejudiced or-unemotional is 
what I am trying to drive at mostly; that if this keeps 
up, if I am kept on the jury, I think I will be a sub-
headline as long as the trial goes on. I will definitely 
have a nervous breakdown in a very short time and, 
in fact, I feel I am just about ready for one right 
now." (R. 1600-1601) 
The Trial Court excused Juror Manning on the ground 
that he was both disabled and disqualified. 
Revised Code Section 2945.29 (13443-13) provides: 
"Jurors becoming unable to perform duties. If, be-
fore the conclusion of the trial, a juror becomes sick, 
or for other reason is unable to perform his duty, the 
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Court may order him to be discharged. In that case, 
if alternate jurors have been selected, one of them 
shall be designated to take the place of the juror so 
discharged. If, after all alternate jurors have been 
made regular jurors, a juror becomes too incapacitated 
to perform his duty, and has been discharged by the 
. Court, a new juror may be sworn and the trial begin 
anew, or the jury may be discharged and a new jury 
then or thereafter impaneled." 
Revised Code Section 2313.37 (11419-47) provides 
in part: 
"If before the final submission of the case to the 
jury a juror becomes incapacitated or disqualified, he 
may be discharged by the judge, in which case, or if a 
juror dies, upon the order of the judge, said addi-
tional or alternate juror shall become one of the jury 
and serve in all respects as though selected as an 
original juror." 
The defense contend that they had one challenge 
left when Juror Manning was excused and his place taken 
by alternate Juror Hanson (Pet. Br., p. 51). As the Court 
of Appeals stated: 
"The defendant entered his exception to the pro-
cedure used by the Court in discharging Juror Man-
ning and demanded the right to exercise his remain-
ing peremptory challenge when the first alternate 
juror was seated in the panel after Manning was dis-
charged, which request was refused. 
"After a jury is sworn and charged with the de-
livery of the defendant, the trial is commenced and 
unused peremptory challenges cannot thereafter be 
used and where an alternate juror has been selected 
and sworn as provided by law, he must be seated in 
the place of the discharged juror by order of the 
Court." (Pet. App., 38a-39a) 
In any event, there is here no federal question. 
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The prospective jurors were questioned at very great 
length by both counsel for the State and the defense, and 
the Court. In fact, there are three volumes of the Bill of 
Exceptions, totaling hundreds of pages, setting forth such 
detailed examination. Except for Juror Manning who was 
discharged, the 13 jurors who sat and heard this case, and 
the 12 jurors who decided this case, were all competent 
and qualified jurors, without prejudice or bias, and the 
record discloses that they gave most careful and adequate 
consideration to the case. 
IV. 
Conduct of the bailiffs in permitting jurors to telephone 
members of their families between deliberations (Pet. 
Br., pp. 52-54). 
We wish to point out, at the outset, that the matters 
complained of took place in the hotel room when some 
of the jurors called their husbands or children on the tele-
phone, and not in the jury room during the deliberations 
(Petitioner's Brief, pp. 52-53). The jurors deliberated in 
a room above the court room in the Criminal Courts Build-
ing and there is absolutely no evidence in the record show-
ing any misconduct of the jury or of the officers in charge. 
The telephone calls to the husbands and children of 
the jurors, all made in the presence of the bailiff, were 
not made during the deliberations of the jury. They were 
made from the hotel room to which they had been taken 
from the jury room and there is no evidence whatsoever 
that the case was even discussed in these telephone calls, 
much less anything said prejudicial to the petitioner. 
There is no evidence whatsoever of telephone con-
versations with strangers, as suggested in the brief of the 
petitioner. The testimony of Bailiff Edgar Francis follows: 
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"Q. Do you know, of your own knowledge, 
whether there was any telephone communications 
made out of any of the respective rooms that were 
occupied by any members of the jury? 
A. Their phones were cut out, Mr. Garmone. 
Q. By whose request? 
A. Mr. Steenstra arranged that. 
Q. And were there any telephone calls made 
from the room that you occupied? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you make the calls, or did the jury make 
the calls? 
A. No. The jury made the calls, and I sat in the 
chair right alongside the telephone. 
* * * 
Q. Mr. Bailiff, what was the purpose of the calls 
that the jurors made in your presence? 
* * * 
A. Well, they were made to their husbands and 
wives, and those that had children, they talked to the 
children. 
Q. Was there any conversation whatsoever about 
this case or their deliberations? 
A. Not one word, Mr. Parrino." (R. 7084-7085.) 
The defense saw fit to call certain jurors to the wit-
ness stand on their motion for new trial and if they wished 
to pursue this matter further, they had the right and 
opportunity so to do. They chose not to do so and there 
is nothing in the record whatever of anything having been 
said or done either by the bailiffs or by or to the jurors 
prejudicial to the defendant. 
The trial court stated when a supplemental motion 
for new trial was filed: 
"The court named Simon Steenstra, permanent 
criminal jury bailiff and Edgar Francis his own court-
room bailiff as the persons to have charge of the jury 
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in their movements during the period of deliberation. 
They were named in open court in the presence of 
all interested parties. Both were well known to all 
parties, with the possible exception of defendant, and 
not a word of objection was voiced by anyone. Fur-
thermore, one of counsel for the defense saw the 
court in chambers prior to the selection of said bailiffs 
and inquired of the court who he intended to appoint 
to take charge of the jury during the deliberation 
period. Upon being informed that the court would 
name Bailiffs Steenstra and Francis he expressed his 
whole-hearted approval." (Pet. App., pp. 16a-17a). 
The Supreme Court of Ohio in the opinion states: 
"Defendant contends that he was prejudiced in 
this case by the actions of two officers of the court, 
in whose charge the jury was committed during its 
deliberations, in permitting some members of the jury 
to make unmonitored telephone calls in violation of 
Section 2945.33, Revised Code, which reads as follows: 
'When a cause is finally submitted the jurors 
must be kept together in a convenient place under 
the charge of an officer until they agree upon a 
verdict, or are discharged by the court. The court 
may permit the jurors to separate during the ad-
journment of court overnight, under proper cau-
tions, or under supervision of an officer. Such 
officer shall not permit a communication to be made 
to them, nor make any himself except to ask if 
they have agreed upon a verdict, unless he does 
so by order of the court. * * *' 
"It is conceded that no authorization for such tele-
pl).one calls was given by the court. 
"At the conclusion of each day's deliberation, the 
members of this jury were housed in the Carter 
Hotel, under the supervision of two court bailiffs. 
The record reveals that the telephones in the hotel 
rooms occupied by individual jurors had been 'cut 
I 
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out.' However, some of them were permitted to make 
calls on the telephone in the room of one of the bailiffs. 
"In connection with a motion for a new trial, the 
record discloses the following cross-examination of one 
of the bailiffs by counsel for defendant: 
'Q. Did you make the calls, or did the jury 
make the calls? 
A. No. The jury made the calls, and I sat in 
the chair right alongside the telephone.' 
"On redirect examination, the testimony was as 
follows: 
'Q. Mr. Bailiff, what was the purpose of the 
calls that the jurors made in your presence? 
* * * 
A. Well, they were made to their husbands 
and wives, and those that had children, they talked 
to the children. 
Q. Was there any conversation whatsoever 
about this case or their deliberations? 
A. Not one word, Mr. Parrino.' 
"Counsel for defendant rely upon State v. Adams, 
141 Ohio St., 423, 48 N. E. (2d) 861, 146 A. L. R. 
509, as authority for their contention that the action 
of the bailiff in permitting these telephone calls 
constituted error prejudicial to the defendant. They 
cite the third paragraph of the syllabus of that case, 
which reads: 
'The violation by a court officer in charge of a 
jury of Section 13448-1, General Code (Section 
2945.33, Revised Code), to the effect that he shall 
not communicate with a jury in his charge or cus-
tody except to inquire whether it has reached a 
verdict, will be presumed to be prejudicial to a de-
fendant against whom, after such communication, 
a verdict is returned by such jury.' 
"A mere reading of the following fourth paragraph 
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of the syllabus of the Adams case should be sufficient 
to distinguish that case from the present one: 
'Where a court bailiff, on being informed by 
the jury during its deliberations that it could not 
agree, stated to it: 'You can't do that. You must 
reach a decision if you have to stay here for three 
months,' there is a violation of the statute which 
is prejudicial to a defendant against whom, follow-
ing such declaration, a verdict is returned by the 
jury.' 
"The case of Emmert v. State, 127 Ohio St., 235, 
187 N. E. 862, 90 A. L. R. 242, although not cited by 
defendant, might also be authority for the proposi-
tion that misconduct of a bailiff is ground for re-
versal. That case, however, is also readily distinguish-
able from the present one. In the Emmert case the 
officer in charge of the jury, at a time when it was 
not actually in its deliberative sessions, said to certain 
members of the jury: 'My God, you are all wet. Judge 
Stahl expects you to return a verdict of guilty and if 
you don't it will be just too bad.' Other remarks 
of a similar nature to the effect that the jury had to 
reach a verdict were made by the bailiff. 
"In situations such as those in the Adams and 
Emmert cases, it is easy to presume prejudice to the 
defendant as a result of the conduct of the bailiff. Can 
the same be said of the conduct of the bailiffs here in 
permitting jurors, who for several days and nights 
had been sequestered and unable to see or hear from 
their husbands, wives or children, to telephone those 
members of their families? We do not think so. There 
is, on the contrary, every reason to believe that as-
surances of the health and welfare of their loved ones 
would tend to ease the jurors' minds as to personal 
matters and would make them better, more conscien-
tious jurors. Time after time, the members of this 
jury were instructed by the court not to communicate 
with anyone concerning this case or permit anyone to 
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communicate with them about it. We must assume 
they followed the court's instructions. No complaint 
is made that they disregarded these instructions every 
night for some seven weeks that they were allowed 
to go home at the close of each day's session of the 
trial. It is difficult to visualize a juror who will follow 
a court's instruction during the many hours he spends 
each evening and week end with his family and then 
deliberately disregard that instruction in a few brief 
moments he speaks to a member of his family on the 
telephone in the presence of a bailiff. 
"The law in Ohio is that no judgment of conviction 
shall be reversed in any court for any cause unless it 
appears affirmatively from the record that the de-
fendant was prejudiced thereby or was prevented 
from having a fair trial. Section 2945.83, Revised 
Code. There is no such affirmative showing of prej-
udice here, and this Court will not presume a prej-
udice as a matter of law from the fact that some of 
the jurors made telephone calls to members of their 
immediate families." (Pet. App., pp. 89a-92a.) 
v. 
On the claim that the authorities seized the home of the 
petitioner (Pet. Br., pp. 54-56). 
The defense make reference to matters concerning 
the possession of the home (Pet. Br., pp. 55, 62) which 
they made an issue on the motion for new trial on the 
ground of newly discovered evidence, which motion was 
denied by the trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals 
of Cuyahoga County in 100 Ohio Appeals 399 and dis-
missed on appeal by the Supreme Court of Ohio in 164 
0. St. 428. No appeal has been taken from the final action 
of the Supreme Court of Ohio and the judgment of our 
State courts thereon is now final. Notwithstanding the 
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finality of this judgment, the defense again drag into their 
petition for a writ of certiorari the unfounded claim that 
they were prevented from examining the premises. The 
Court of Appeals, in a well reasoned and extended opinion, 
have completely answered this claim in 100 Ohio Appeals 
at pages 406-407: 
"During the trial the defendant subpoenaed the keys 
into court through Chief Eaton and demanded the 
right to retain them. The trial judge, however, ruled 
that they must remain in the possession of the police 
of Bay Village, which order was carried out until 
December 23, 1954, when complete possession of the 
house was given the defendant. There is no evidence 
.that any request to enter the house for the purpose 
of investigation and inspection was ever made by the 
defendant, nor does the record show any formal ap-
plication to the court at any time for a like purpose. 
Dr. A. J. Kazlauckas, a physician and expert who had 
spent many years as a deputy coroner of Cuyahoga 
County, was in the employ of the defendant. He ex-
amined all the articles of property pertaining to this 
case in the possession of the county coroner, together 
with the autopsy report, conclusions of laboratory 
findings and X-rays of Marilyn Sheppard, and yet 
made no effort to make any scientific examination of 
the premises. He was not even presented as a witness 
during the trial. Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Saul 
S. Danaceau deposes in his affidavit that he informed 
Arthur E. Petersilge, of counsel for the defendant, 
and the brother of the defendant, Dr. Stephen Shep-
pard, in early November, 'that t.he said house was 
available to the defendant at any and all times to in-
spect or conduct investigations therein.' It seems, 
however, that it was understood that on all occasions 
a police officer would have to accompany the defend-
ant or any representative of his when visiting the 
home." 
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The record of this case shows the extreme importance 
of numerous articles of property within the home and 
a number of such articles appear as exhibits in the evi-
dence. It was also necessary to continue the examination 
and search in and about the house for possible clews and 
particularly for the still missing T-shirt and weapon. The 
record will disclose the continuous examination of the 
premises for blood spots, fingerprints, etc., by the scienti-
fic unit of the Cleveland Police Department and by mem-
bers of the staff of the county coroner. As stated by the 
trial court, the prosecutor "could very well have been sub-
ject to just criticism" had he directed Chief Eaton to act 
otherwise. 
Further complaint is made that the Court erred in not 
ordering the keys to the house turned over to Mr. Corrigan 
during the testimony of Chief Eaton. This episode oc-
curred during the closing days of the trial when a sub-
poena was issued to Chief Eaton, requesting the Chief to 
bring with him the keys to the house. As a matter of fact, 
the defendant, counsel for the defense, and the members 
of the defendant's family had never been denied an op-
portunity to enter the premises or any part thereof, or 
to make an examination or investigation therein. Also, as 
a matter of fact, the defendant, counsel, and defendant's 
family ,had visited the premises and at no time had they 
been denied access thereto. 
The cross examination of Chief Eaton at that time , 
by Mr. Mahon, was as follows: 
"Q. Chief, since you have had that key-you got 
it some time in November, the key to the house; is 
that right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. From that time down to date has the house 
been accessible to the Sheppard family? 
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A. Yes, it has. 
Q. And have they been in the house during that 
period of time? 
A. Once, on one occasion, at least. 
Q. To take care of the heat, and so forth, and 
water, and all of those things? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have they ever been denied at any time the 
right to go into that house since you have had pos-
session of the keys? · 
A. They have not." (R. 6076.) 
"By Mr. Corrigan: 
Q. And the order that Sam Sheppard could not 
go into his home, where did that come from? 
A. Pardon me. Will you repeat that? 
Mr. Danaceau: We object to that. We know 
of no such order. 
Q. Did you make that order? 
Mr. Danaceau: Just a minute. 
Mr. Mahon: Was there such an order? 
The Court: Let him tell what the situation 
was. 
Mr. Mahon: There is no evidence there ever 
was such an order. 
The Court: No, there isn't any evidence about 
an order, but he is the Chief of Police. Let him an-
swer if there was. 
A. I didn't understand the question, I'm sorry. 
The Court: Will you restate your question, Mr. 
Corrigan? The Chief doesn't understand it. Or 
let the reporter repeat it. 
(Question read by the reporter.) 
A. There was no order he could not go in his 
home. 
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Q. The order that Sam Sheppard could not go 
into his home except in the custody of a policeman or 
with a policeman, how did that originate? 
A. That was suggested, I believe, by the prose-
cutor's office." (R. 6077-6078.) 
Obviously, the whole episode in the closing days of 
the trial, and the demand for the keys in the presence of 
the jury was a grandstand play and show, and nothing else. 
In the meantime, the defendant and his counsel had, 
on more than one occasion, visited the home and, as pre-
viously pointed out, went through all the rooms and ex-
amined the house, both inside and outside. The defendant 
was permitted to remove his medical bags and the con-
tents. He and the members of his family were also per-
mitted to remove his clothing, Chip's clothing, and various 
other articles. Also removed were his automobiles, con-
sisting of a Jaguar, a Lincoln Continental and a jeep. Ex-
cept for the Lincoln Continental, all of these articles of 
property were removed within a week or two following the 
murder of Marilyn Sheppard and became unavailable for 
further examination by the scientific unit of the Cleveland 
Police Department when, at a later date, the case was 
turned over to them for further investigation. Also made 
available to the defense for their inspection were all of 
the articles in the possession of the county coroner and 
such articles were examined by Fred Garmone, counsel 
for the defense, and by Dr. Anthony J. Kazlauckas, a 
former deputy coroner of the county, on behalf of the 
defense (100 Ohio Appeals p. 403). 
In the words of the trial court (Opinion overruling 
motion for new trial on newly discovered evidence): 
"Seldom indeed does the entire interior of a home be-
come as important as the interior of this home seemed 
to be in the period in question and while complete 
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exclusion of the representatives of the defense would 
not be justified, it is only rational to believe that the 
Prosecuting Attorney was fully justified in preserv-
ing the scene in status quo pending tr~al and its out-
come. The two affidavits last mentioned and the 
statements of all counsel in open court clearly indi-
cate that the prosecution had no desire to conceal 
anything and must lead the Court to the co_nclusion 
that there existed neither concealment nor hmdrance 
and that the condition imposed, already mentioned, 
was merely precautionary. It is not unlikely that 
failure to take possession of the property and failure 
to take the precaution taken could very well have 
been subject to just criticism." 
VI. 
All of the claimed violations of the petitioner's constitu-
tional rights to a fair trial were passed upon by the 
Supreme Court. 
In the Supreme Court of Ohio it was claimed that the 
petitioner was denied due process of law, but apart from 
quotations from "Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science" and several cases, nothing 
specific was shown wherein the petitioner was denied 
due process of law, in any one of the claimed errors. 
The Supreme Court, in its opinion, discusses at great 
length the matter of publicity and the various motions for 
a change of venue. In its opinion at page 87a of the Ap-
pendix to the Petition, it is said: 
"It should be borne in mind, however, that the 
legal question presented to us is whether the defe~d­
ant was accorded a fair constitutional trial by an im-
partial jury which could decide the issues of fact solely 
upon the consideration of the evidence in_ the_ light of 
the law given it by the court. That question is not to 
be decided on the volume of the publicity or the 
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tendency such publicity may have had in influencing 
the public mind generally as to the defendant's guilt 
or innocence." 
After further discussion, the Supreme Court in its 
opinion at page 88a of the Appendix continues: 
"The same motion, advanced for the same reason, 
was renewed on five other occasions during the trial, 
and the trial court in each instance overruled the mo-
tion. 
"We believe the trial court was justified in those 
rulings." 
Continuing, the Supreme Court said at pages 88a-89a: 
"If the jury system is to remain a part of our sys-
tem of jurisprudence, the courts and litigants must 
have faith in the inherent honesty of our citizens in 
performing their duty as jurors courageously and 
without fear or favor. Of the 75 prospective jurors 
called pursuant to this venire only 14 were excused 
because they had formed a firm opinion as to the 
guilt or innocence of the defendant. A full panel was 
accepted before this venire was exhausted, and de-
fendant exercised but five of his allotted six peremp-
tory challenges. 
"In the light of these facts, and particularly in 
the light of the fact that a jury was impaneled and 
sworn to try this case fairly and impartially on the 
evidence and the law, this Court cannot say that the 
denial of a change of venue by the trial judge con-
stituted an abuse of discretion." 
Then, the Supreme Court said further, at page 94a: 
"The facts were presented to 12 qualified jurors 
sworn to well and truly try the issues between the 
State of Ohio and Sam H. Sheppard. In what was ob-
viously a careful, complete and correct charge, Judge 
Blythin instructed that jury as to the law applicable 
to those facts. In such a situation, the following words 
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of Mr. Justice Holmes, in Aikens v. State of Wiscon-
sin, 195 U.S. 194, 206, 49 L. Ed. 154, 25 S. Ct. 3, are 
appropriate: 
'But it must be assumed that the constitutional 
tribunal does its duty and finds facts only because 
they are proved." 
At the conclusion of its opinion, the Supreme Court said, 
at pp. 94a-95a: 
"We have carefully examined the other errors 
assigned and find none, either in the admission or 
rejection of evidence or in the instructions of the 
court, prejudicial to the defendant." 
VII. 
The petitioner claims that the Supreme Court of Ohio was 
an illegally constituted court at the time the court 
heard this case. 
This is just another example of the numerous frivolous 
claims made by the defense. It was at their instance, and 
without informing the prosecution of their intention, that 
the Chief Justice disqualified himself and appointed an-
other judge. No objection was made prior to the hearing 
on this case in the Supreme Court and it was not until 
after the court as constituted made its decision adverse to 
the defense, that they first raised the issue. 
An analysis of Article IV, Section 2 of the Ohio Con-
stitution (Pet. Br. p. 59) will disclose that if any of the 
judges shall be unable, by reason of "illness, disability or 
disqualification" to hear, consider and decide a cause or 
causes, the Chief Justice may direct a judge of the Court 
of Appeals to sit in the place of such judge on the Supreme 
Court, but that only in the case of absence or disability of 
the Chief Justice (not mere disqualification) is the judge 
having the longest period of service upon the Supreme 
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Court authorized to direct an appellate judge to sit. Where 
the Chief Justice merely disqualifies himself and is not 
absent or disabled, it is the Chief Justice who directs the 
appellate judge to sit with the judges of the Supreme 
Court. 
The defense raised this issue on rehearing before the 
Supreme Court of Ohio and their application for rehearing 
was denied. This is purely a State constitutional question, 
decided by the highest court of the State of Ohio adversely 
to the defense and there is involved therein no Federal 
constitutional question. 
SUMMATION. 
Essentially, the petition before this Court is based on 
the publicity. Much of the publicity complained of oc-
curred long before the trial took place. The trial judge 
was thoroughly familiar with the treatment given the 
murder mystery by the news media and was certainly in 
the best position to determine whether or not the peti-
tioner would receive a fair trial. Much of the newspaper 
publicity in this case was inspired by the lack of coopera-
tion of the petitioner with the authorities beginning im-
media+ely after the murder of his wife was committed, 
by the protective shield thrown around him, and by the 
strategy of his counsel. None of the publicity was de-
liberately promoted by the prosecution. To hold that pub-
licity in and of itself is a denial of due process of law is to 
fetter the State in the prosecution of crime and in bringing 
to justice the person responsible for such crime. Any 
sensational murder such as this brings forth publicity, 
some more, some less, but in the circumstances of each 
case, the issue before the trial court is whether a fair and 
impartial jury can be obtained. The jurors who sat in 
the trial of this case were all thoroughly examined and 
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definitely stated that they would give to the defendant the 
benefit of the presumption of innocence. They were fully 
examined so far as defense counsel desired as to any 
knowledge or information they might have of the case. 
At no stage of the proceedings did the petitioner offer any 
evidence to prove that any juror was in fact prejudiced 
by the publicity, and, moreover, a period of two months 
and a half intervened between the day of the petitioner's 
arrest and the beginning of the trial. 
The presumption is that the jurors followed the in-
structions of the court. A distrust of the jury without 
any affirmative showing that they were not to be trusted 
in following out the court's instructions is what counsel 
for the petitioner urges upon this Court. 
The defense repeatedly assert that the newspapers 
were hostile to the petitioner and sought his conviction. 
Though this unsupported claim is constantly repeated 
and grows in vehemence each time it is so repeated, it 
is simply not the fact. News agencies such as newspapers 
and the radio were greatly interested in the case, as they 
would be in any similar case. The news stories and broad-
casts giving their respective versions of the testimony in 
the case and of the other proceedings had, may not at all 
times have been agreeable or pleasing to either the State 
or the defense. Certainly, the court has no control over 
what the newspapers shall print or what the radio stations 
shall broadcast. As far as the jurors were concerned, they 
were repeatedly instructed to disregard all such stories 
and broadcasts and to decide the case solely on the basis 
of the evidence presented in open court and on the law 
given to them by the judge. 
The claims of the defense that the jury and the offi-
cers in charge of the jury during its deliberations were 
guilty of misconduct to the prejudice of the petitioner is 
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based on the mere assertion and argument of counsel. 
There is no evidence that the petitioner was prejudiced. 
On the contrary, the jurors deliberated patiently, carefully 
and thoughtfully for a period of five days, and reached a 
verdict which responded to the evidence. 
Petitioner has seen fit to place in the Appendix to 
the petition for a writ of certiorari the opinions expressed 
in some scattered newspaper articles that he did not have 
a fair trial. Surely, such opinions are not evidence in 
this case and should not be received as a substitute for evi-
dence, nor as a substitute for the well-reasoned opinions of 
the trial and reviewing state courts based upon the record. 
Again, we have the situation where it is the defense and 
not the State that is dragging the newspapers into this 
case. 
A complete and fair analysis of the record discloses 
no foundation in fact for the claims advanced for the 
allowance of a writ of certiorari. Nor has the state supreme 
court or the trial or appellate state court decided a federal 
question of substance not theretofore determined by this 
Court, nor in a way not in accord with applicable decisions 
of this Court. 
On the record there is no real or substantial Federal 
question involved herein and the petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANK T. CuLLITAN, 
Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 
SAUL s. DANACEAU, 
GERTRUDE BAUER MAHON, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
\ 
(' 
I I 
,'I 
,, 
,, 
:1 
i~ 
p::.qy "*Jl!f '' i":___fli1:1 t p ;ptt,£47I'U,Ci4 e 
\' \ 
!" J -
1/ \ 
/1 
•I' 
I 
' '' (\ 
"--1 ,,, 
r:, \ 
'1 
1' 
1. 
,, 
i I 
I I 
;·, 
: I 
\ ' 
I 
'\ 
